How E-waste challenges environmental governance by Bisschop, L.C.J. (Lieselot)
www.crimejusticejournal.com	IJCJ&SD	2014	Vol	3	No	2:	81‐95	 	ISSN	2202–8005	
	
©	The	Author(s)	2014	
How	e‐Waste	Challenges	Environmental	Governance		
Lieselot	Bisschop		
John	Jay	College	of	Criminal	Justice,	USA;	Ghent	University,	Belgium1	
	
	
	
Abstract	
This	article	examines	how	e‐waste	–	waste	from	electronic	and	electrical	equipment	–	poses	a	
challenge	for	environmental	governance.	The	amount	of	e‐waste	generated	globally	has	been	
estimated	to	reach	about	72	billion	tons	annually	by	2017.	This	article	discusses	how	e‐waste	
challenges	the	control	of	 illegal	trade	as	well	as	the	prevention	of	environmental	harms.	By	
focusing	on	the	role	of	state,	corporate	and	civil	 society	actors,	 insights	are	gained	 into	the	
strengths	and	limitations	of	the	governance	framework.	These	suggest	the	need	for	reflection	
about	both	practical	and	theoretical	implications	that	arise	for	environmental	governance.		
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Introduction	
E‐waste	–	waste	from	electronic	and	electrical	equipment2	–	is	a	rapidly	growing	market,	with	
72	 billion	 tons	 estimated	 to	 be	 generated	 annually	 worldwide	 by	 2017	 (Duan	 et	 al.	 2013).	
Obviously,	 the	 digital	 (r)evolution	 has	 resulted	 in	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 the	 quantity	 of	 e‐
waste	 but	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 waste	 has	 also	 changed	 with	 the	 use	 of	 hazardous	 substances	
(Pellow	2007).	E‐waste	 is	 considered	a	hazardous	waste	because	some	of	 its	 components	are	
harmful	to	the	environment	and/or	to	human	health	when	they	are	not	disposed	of	with	care.	
Examples	of	 such	substances	are	heavy	metals	such	as	 lead	(for	example,	 in	CRT	screens	and	
batteries),	 cadmium	 (for	 example,	 in	 printer	 inks	 and	 toners)	 and	 compounds	 such	 as	
chlorofluorocarbon	(CFC	in	cooling	units).3	When	inappropriately	disposed	of,	e‐waste	pollutes	
the	 soil,	 air	 and	water,	 thereby	harming	eco‐systems,	 crops,	 and	drinking	water,	 thus	causing	
harm	to	human	health	and	the	natural	environment	(Baker	et	al.	2004;	Schluep	et	al.	2011).	The	
precarious	working	 circumstances	 in	 dismantling	 e‐waste	 in	West	Africa	 and	 South	East	Asia	
have	 also	 been	 documented	 several	 times	 (Bisschop	 and	 Vande	Walle	 2013).	 Other	 types	 of	
harm	 relate	 to	 low	 material	 recovery	 rates,	 which	 is	 problematic	 in	 times	 when	 natural	
resources	 are	 scarce,	 and	 the	 unfair	 price	 settings	 which	 disadvantage	 treatment	 companies	
that	do	adhere	to	environmental	regulations.		
	
Waste	 is	one	of	 the	most	prominent	environmental	 issues	 in	contemporary	society	and	at	 the	
same	time	one	of	the	most	normalized.	The	magnitude	of	the	waste	problem	is	significant	and	
has	increased	with	the	pace	of	world	population	and	consumption.	As	regulations	on	releasing	
waste	 into	water,	 air	 and	 land	 have	 become	more	 stringent,	 the	 price	 of	waste	management	
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services	has	increased	(Vander	Beken	2007).	This	has	caused	waste,	including	hazardous	waste,	
to	become	an	important	article	of	trade.	For	instance,	about	15	per	cent	of	all	trade	within	the	
European	 Union	 (EU)	 is	 trade	 in	 waste	 (IMPEL‐TFS	 2006).	 As	 for	 the	 cross‐border	 or	
transnational	dimension	of	the	waste	trade,	most	stays	within	the	same	region	(for	example,	the	
EU)	 or	 takes	 place	 between	 countries	 that	 are	 members	 of	 the	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	
Cooperation	and	Development	(OECD).	
	
The	reasons	for	the	trade	in	(hazardous)	waste	are	diverse.	First,	several	countries	do	not	have	
the	necessary	facilities	to	treat	their	hazardous	waste	or	lack	sufficient	capacity	to	treat	all	of	it.	
Also,	certain	types	of	waste	can	only	be	dealt	with	in	a	limited	number	of	facilities.	Examples	of	
these	are	the	Swan	Hills	facility	in	Alberta	Canada	which	treats	dioxins	and	furan	contaminated	
materials	 and	 the	 nuclear	 fuel	 recycling	 plant	 in	 La	 Hague	 France.	 Additionally,	 West	 Africa	
currently	lacks	treatment	facilities	for	hazardous	waste.	Second,	sometimes	a	facility	in	another	
country	 is	 closer	 than	one	 in	 the	 country	of	 origin	of	 the	waste	 and	hence	 transport	 across	a	
border	 makes	 sense.	 Third,	 certain	 types	 of	 hazardous	 waste	 contain	 valuable	 secondary	
materials	to	be	used	in	production	processes	in	receiving	countries.	For	e‐waste,	 in	particular,	
this	issue	of	recycling	and	re‐using	secondary	materials	is	prominent.	Fourth,	and	perhaps	most	
importantly,	it	is	often	less	expensive	to	send	waste	to	another	country.4		
	
Because	 of	 the	 above‐mentioned	 harms	 resulting	 from	 inadequate	 recycling	 or	 disposal	 of	
waste,	 the	 trade	 in	 waste	 is	 regulated	 in	 multilateral	 environmental	 agreements.5	 The	 trade	
flows	that	are	most	likely	to	result	in	inadequate	recycling	or	disposal	are	those	from	developed	
countries	(for	example	EU,	USA,	Australia)	to	less‐developed	ones	(in	Africa,	South	East	Asia	and	
South	America)	(Basel	Action	Network,	2005;	Crem,	2008;	Puckett	and	Smith,	2002).	In	fact,	the	
illegal	 trade	 in	 and	 disposal	 of	 hazardous	 waste	 has	 been	 identified	 as	 a	 major	 form	 of	
environmental	crime.	Under	European	law,	for	instance,	it	is	illegal	to	export	toxic	waste	to	non‐
EU	 countries	with	weaker	 standards	 for	 disposal.	Although	 exact	 data	 do	not	 exist,	 results	 of	
enforcement	actions	coordinated	by	the	European	Union	Network	for	the	Implementation	and	
Enforcement	of	Environmental	Law	(IMPEL)	give	some	indication	of	the	scale	of	the	violations	
(IMPEL‐TFS	 2012).	 Of	 the	 total	 number	 of	waste	 inspections	 carried	 out,	 28.9	 per	 cent	were	
either	 an	 administrative	 violation,	which	 refers	 to	missing	 or	 incomplete	 forms	 (for	 example	
Annex	VII),	or	an	illegal	shipment,	which	refers	to	a	transport	that	is	subject	to	an	export	ban.6	
Waste	 from	 electronic	 and	 electrical	 equipment	 (WEEE)	 is	 one	 of	 the	 major	 waste	 streams	
among	these	transport	violations.	Overall,	one	in	five	containers	exported	from	the	EU	contains	
waste	and	an	estimated	20	per	cent	of	 those	are	 in	violation	of	export	bans	or	administrative	
requirements	for	waste	trading	(Baird	et	al.	2014).	The	data	available	on	the	illegal	trade	in	e‐
waste	 reflect,	 however,	 the	 control	 that	 takes	 place	 and	 are	 not	 necessarily	 an	 accurate	
representation	of	the	scale	of	smuggling	(Bisschop	2012).	
	
Against	 this	 background,	 this	 article	 aims	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 how	 e‐waste	 challenges	
environmental	governance.	Governance	differs	from	government,	because	it	is	not	limited	to	the	
engagement	of	state	actors	(Holley	et	al.	2012;	Parker	and	Braithwaite	2003).	Governance	refers	
to	 different	 social	 and	 political	 units	 that	 govern	 social	 interactions	 such	 as	 corporations,	
international	 organisations	 and	 non‐governmental	 organizations	 (NGOs).	 Governance	 in	 this	
article	 equates	 to	 those	 initiatives	 that	 aim	 to	 prevent	 the	 harm	 of	 sub‐standard	 e‐waste	
disposal	 and	 to	 control	 the	 illegal	 e‐waste	 trade.	 This	 article	 draws	 on	 theories	 about	
environmental	 governance	 and	 responsive	 regulation	 (Holley	 et	 al.	 2012;	 Parker	 and	
Braithwaite	2003)	throughout.		
	
The	following	section	discusses	the	methodology	of	the	study	and	sketches	the	characteristics	of	
the	 research	 context.	 The	 article	 continues	 by	 discussing	 the	 challenges	 inherent	 to	 e‐waste	
both	 as	 a	 commodity	 and	 as	 a	 sector	 and	 then	 explains	 the	 problems	 accompanying	 legal	
definitions	 and	 policy	 making.	 The	 focus	 then	 shifts	 to	 the	 complexities	 inherent	 in	 the	
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implementation	 of	 policy	 regarding	 e‐waste	 and	 the	 difficulties	 that	 emerge	 in	 various	
interactions	between	governance	actors	in	preventing	harm	and	controlling	crime	related	to	e‐
waste.	Attention	 is	 paid	 to	 the	 importance	and	difficulty	 of	 involving	 local	 governance	actors,	
corporations	 and	non‐governmental	 organizations	 in	 governing	e‐waste.	This	 article	does	not	
provide	an	exhaustive	list	of	the	governance	challenges	in	dealing	with	e‐waste	but	focuses	on	a	
number	of	 core	 themes.	This	approach	demonstrates,	nevertheless,	 the	 rich	complexity	of	 the	
reality	of	governance.	
	
Method	and	research	context	
This	 article	 draws	 on	 the	 findings	 of	 a	 case	 study	 describing	 the	 trade	 of	 e‐waste	 passing	
through	 the	 port	 of	 Antwerp	 in	 Belgium	 (Bisschop	 2013).7	 The	 flows	 between	 Belgium	 and	
Ghana	were	 the	 particular	 focus.	 The	 analysis	 is	 thus	 tailored	 to	 that	 specific	 empirical	 case.	
Antwerp,	with	a	total	annual	freight	volume	of	185	million	tons	is	among	the	top	three	ports	in	
Europe	alongside	Rotterdam	and	Hamburg.	Antwerp	is	a	landlord	port,	owned	by	government	
and	managed	by	a	port	authority	which	gives	up	its	control	over	port	operations	by	leasing	the	
infrastructure	to	private	terminal	operators	(Talley	2009).	The	Antwerp	port,	covering	130	km²,	
180km	of	quay,	400km	of	roads,	1000km	of	railway	and	with	about	900	companies	working	in	
the	 port	 precinct,	 is	 a	 complex	 area	 for	 prevention	 and	 control.	 The	 territory	 of	 the	 port	 of	
Antwerp	 is	 governed	 by	 two	 jurisdictions	 (Dendermonde	 and	 Antwerp)	 and	 three	
municipalities	 (Antwerp,	 Beveren	 and	 Zwijndrecht),	 and	 falls	 under	 the	 responsibility	 of	 two	
provincial	 governments	 (East‐Flanders	 and	 Antwerp).	 Given	 the	 sheer	 volume	 of	 trade,	
Antwerp	employs	a	risk‐analysis	system	to	control	transport.	Less	than	1	per	cent	of	containers	
are	scanned.	About	80	per	cent	of	the	waste	that	is	traded	in	the	port	is	in	transit,	the	other	20	
per	cent	has	its	origin	or	destination	within	the	territory	of	Belgium.		
	
In	 Ghana,	 the	 port	 of	 Tema	 handles	 over	 half	 this	 country’s	 trade	 and	 is	 also	 an	 important	
gateway	for	Burkina	Faso,	Mali	and	Niger.	In	2012	it	handled	11.5	million	tons	of	freight,	a	50	
per	cent	increase	compared	to	2008.	Imports	account	for	about	80	per	cent,	exports	15	per	cent,	
and	transit	freight	5	per	cent	(Eshun	and	Rasmussen	2013).	All	containers	arriving	in	Tema	are	
either	scanned	or	physically	inspected	by	unloading	them.		
	
This	article	makes	no	claims	about	being	able	to	generalize	from	these	findings	to	the	cases	of	
other	 regions	 and	 trade	 flows.	 By	 analysing	 the	 case	 within	 its	 broader	 contexts	 and	 paying	
attention	 to	 the	 global	 trade	 flows	 it	 does	 provide	 insights	 that	 help	with	 understanding	 the	
challenges	 to	 the	governance	of	 illegal	 trade	 in,	 and	sub‐standard	dismantling	of,	 (e‐)waste	 in	
other	locations.		
	
The	findings	are	based	on	a	multi‐method	approach	of	document	analyses,	interviews	and	field	
visits.	Both	the	document	analyses	and	the	interviews	triangulated	government,	corporate	and	
civil	society	perspectives.	The	document	analyses	studied	the	existing	 international,	European	
and	national	(Belgian	and	Ghanaian)	regulation	and	litigation	as	well	as	available	corporate	and	
NGO	 documents.	 This	 study	 was	 further	 based	 on	 56	 semi‐structured	 interviews	 with	 law	
enforcement	 agencies	 (customs,	 police,	 environmental	 inspectorates,	 port	 authority	 and	
judiciary),	 corporate	 actors	 (shipping	 lines	 and	 agents,	 e‐waste	 collectors	 and	 recyclers)	 and	
civil	society	actors	(informal	e‐waste	workers,	NGOs,	local	communities).	The	findings	from	the	
document	analyses	and	the	 interviews	were	 triangulated	with	data	 from	the	 field	visits	 in	 the	
port	of	Antwerp	(Belgium),	the	city	of	Accra	and	the	port	of	Tema	(Ghana).		
	
Challenged	by	waste	as	a	product	and	a	sector	
There	are	a	number	of	problems	that	relate	 to	waste	as	a	product.	 It	has	been	 linked	to	price	
fixing,	 racketeering	 and	 an	 illegal	market	 in	waste	 (Van	 Daele	 et	 al.	 2007).	 It	 has	 an	 inverse	
incentive	structure	due	to	its	negative	value:	when	you	own	waste,	you	usually	need	to	pay	to	
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get	 rid	 of	 it.	 This	 inverse	 incentive	 structure	 does	 not	 straightforwardly	 apply	 to	 e‐waste	
because	 there	may	 often	 be	 some	 value	 in	 owning	 it	 as	 the	 (precious)	metals	 it	 contains	 are	
worth	retrieving	for	re‐sale.	Waste	is	also	generally	considered	a	product	of	low	integrity	since	
it	can	be	easily	mixed	up	or	sold	as	second	hand	commodities	(Gibbs	et	al.	2010;	Van	Daele	and	
Vander	Beken	2009).	The	transition	 from	being	 ‘legal’	 to	 ‘illegal’	when	dealing	with	waste	can	
occur	 at	 several	 stages.	 This	 can	happen	during	national	 and	 cross‐border	 transportation	but	
also	in	collection	or	disposal.	Waste	can	be	more	cheaply	dealt	with	by	illegal	enterprises	who	
disregard	environmental	regulations	or	by	legal	companies	in	Europe	who	treat	waste	they	are	
not	licensed	to	process	(Ruggiero	and	South	2010).	
	
As	well	as	the	product	itself	attracting	illegal	activity,	the	waste	collecting	and	processing	sector	
as	 a	 whole	 has	 characteristics	 that	 can	 be	 considered	 vulnerable	 to	 crime	 (Van	 Daele	 et	 al.	
2007).	 Its	 rapid	growth	and	 international	 character	have	allowed	a	diverse	range	of	 actors	 to	
work	in	the	waste	industry,	with	brokers	involved	at	different	stages	obscuring	the	paper	trail.	
In	collection,	transport	and	treatment,	multiple	smaller	companies	try	to	compete	with	the	few	
big	 ones.	 Many	 sub‐streams	 of	 waste	 arise	 from	 the	 dismantling	 of	 various	 products	 and	
multiple	 actors	 are	 involved.	 Corporations	 that	 process	 e‐waste	 legally	 and	 have	
environmentally	sound	management	systems	are	few	and	their	prices	are	high.	The	category	of	
e‐waste	includes	many	devices	that	incur	costs	for	treatment	before	disposal	but	some	products	
hold	 enough	 valuable	 components	 to	 make	 recycling	 or	 treatment	 profitable	 (LNE	 and	
Haskoning	 2010).	 For	 the	 former,	 exporting	 them	 as	 second‐hand	 products	 saves	 the	 cost	 of	
treatment	(Interpol	2009).	The	latter	is	a	motivation	for	having	the	goods	dismantled	as	cheaply	
as	 possible	 to	 be	 able	 to	 sell	 the	 raw	materials	 (Sander	 and	 Schilling	 2010).	 ‘You	 can	make	
money	by	“recycling”	e‐waste	in	poorer	environmental	and	social	conditions,	since	this	provides	
you	the	precious	metals	with	lower	labour	costs’	(Corporate	respondent	13).		
	
The	concern	for	the	loss	of	secondary	raw	materials	through	e‐waste	exports	is	very	important	
for	the	EU	as	 it	relies	on	the	inflow	of	e‐waste	for	the	operation	of	 its	high‐standard	recycling	
facilities.	Some	recyclers	see	the	setting	of	stringent	 legislation	on	waste	exports	as	profitable	
for	 their	 business.	 Some	 refurbishers	 even	 set	more	 stringent	 standards	 for	 their	 exports	 of	
used	 electronic	 and	 electrical	 equipment	 (UEEE)	 than	 the	 law	 requires.	 Evaluations	 and	
stakeholder	consultations	are	continuing	with	 the	aim	of	developing	a	certification	scheme	or	
standard	to	demonstrate	that	waste	exported	from	the	EU	to	non‐OECD	countries	can	be	treated	
in	 an	 environmentally	 sound	 manner.	 This	 usually	 involves	 firms	 that	 have	 made	 this	 their	
niche	market.	As	long	as	all	parties	can	benefit	in	a	‘win‐win’	situation,	investments	seem	to	be	
made	but	there	are	also	practical	limitations	(Gunningham	et	al.	2003).	For	example,	producers	
were	found	to	be	cherry‐picking	in	terms	of	their	responsibility	to	take	back	WEEE	from	Ghana.	
Indeed,	 willingness	 and	 ability	 to	 commit	 to	 self‐regulation	 and	 monitoring	 are	 investments	
largely	 limited	 to	 the	 ‘big	 players’	 or	 niche	 corporations	 (Gunningham	 et	 al.	 2003).	 This	 of	
course	 leaves	 a	 multitude	 of	 smaller	 corporations	 where	 self‐regulation	 is	 much	 less	 clear	
(Haines	1997).	Nonetheless,	in	the	supply	chain	of	electronics	and	e‐waste	and	the	due	diligence	
that	 lies	within,	 smaller	 actors	 can	 be	motivated	 to	 set	 high	 standards	 for	 themselves.	 Some	
large	 corporations	 in	 collection	 and	 recycling	 choose	 which	 influx	 of	WEEE/UEEE	 to	 accept,	
depending	on	whether	they	deem	the	source	trustworthy.	There	is	thus	room	to	take	this	a	step	
further	and	to	truly	 integrate	the	environmental	costs	throughout	the	entire	waste	processing	
life	 cycle	 (van	 Erp	 and	 Huisman	 2010).	 To	 address	 this,	 extended	 producer	 responsibility	
policies	have	emerged8	 (Pellow	2007)	but	 the	 implementation	of	 these	 can	 still	 be	 improved.	
Both	 producers	 of	 electronics	 and	 the	waste	 sector	 can	 take	 steps	 to	 prevent	 environmental	
harm	in	the	supply	chain	of	electronics	and	e‐waste.	Although	both	the	product	and	the	sector	
represent	 a	 challenge,	 corporations	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 play	 a	 role	 in	 environmental	
governance.	Major	corporations	such	as	producers	of	electronics	and	(e‐)waste	processors	have	
taken	the	initiative	to	self‐regulate,	albeit	with	varying	degrees	of	success.		
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The	governance	of	the	illegal	trade	in	e‐waste	is	to	a	certain	extent	addressed	through	a	form	of	
‘regulated	 self‐regulation’.	 This	 for	 instance	happens	 in	 the	 risk‐analysis	 system	employed	by	
European	 customs	which	 bases	 its	 controls	 on	 the	management	 systems	 of	 the	 corporations	
besides	 other	 risk	 indicators9	 informed	 by	 legislation	 and	 past	 experience	 of	 customs,	
environmental	 inspectorates,	 police	 and	 administrations.	 Similarly,	 the	 inspectorates	 work	
through	 meta‐regulation	 to	 control	 waste	 corporations.	 Self‐regulation	 has	 the	 advantage	 of	
being	more	attuned	to	the	underlying	processes	of	the	waste	sector	rather	than	having	only	the	
shallow	 effect	 that	 may	 follow	when	 only	 the	 outcomes	 are	 controlled	 (de	 Bree	 2011).	 Self‐
regulation	might	 also	 be	more	 flexible	 in	 addressing	 the	dynamic	 reality	 of	 preventing	 illegal	
transport	 of	 e‐waste	 (for	 example	 perceiving	 CRT	 television	 sets	 as	 WEEE).	 Self‐regulation	
cannot	 address	 the	 entire	 market	 of	 waste	 collection	 and	 processing	 given	 the	 multitude	 of	
small	scale	actors	(Bisschop	2012)	which	makes	it	difficult	to	install	self‐regulation	sector‐wide,	
for	instance	through	certification	schemes	or	extended	responsibility	(Gunningham	et	al.	1998;	
Holley	 et	 al.	 2012).	 Setting	 this	 up	 through	 (regulated)	 self‐regulation	 implies	 that	 all	 parties	
need	to	agree	on	the	purpose	and	benefits	(White	2011).		
	
Challenged	by	legal	definitions	and	policy‐making	
Many	 international	 organizations	 have	 developed	 policy	 mechanisms	 to	 manage	 waste	
generation	and	regulate	the	trade	in	waste	(Iwama	2004).10	Because	it	is	subject	to	international	
conventions,	 the	 trade	 in	 hazardous	 waste	 can	 be	 conceptualized	 in	 terms	 of	 legality	 and	
illegality.	 The	 most	 important	 conventions	 are	 the	 1989	 Basel	 Convention	 on	 the	 Control	 of	
Transboundary	 Movements	 of	 Hazardous	 Wastes	 and	 their	 Disposal	 and	 its	 1995	 Ban	
Amendment	on	Trade	of	Waste	for	Recovery	between	OECD	and	non‐OECD	countries;	the	1987	
Montreal	Protocol	 on	 Substances	 that	Deplete	 the	Ozone	Layer;	 and	 the	2001	OECD	Decision	
concerning	 the	 Control	 of	 Trans‐Boundary	 Movement	 of	 Wastes	 destined	 for	 Recovery	
Operations.	 Basically,	 the	 more	 hazardous	 a	 waste	 shipment	 is,	 the	 more	 stringent	 its	 legal	
requirements	 such	 as	 providing	 information	 about	 the	 facility	 it	 is	 destined	 for,	 or	 obtaining	
prior	 consent	 –	 that	 is,	 before	 the	 transport	 takes	 place	 –	 from	 the	 receiving	 country.	Waste	
crimes	are	considered	an	important	type	of	environmental	crime	and	make	up	a	large	share	of	
the	 cases	 reported	 by	 environmental	 inspectorates.	 These	 can	 refer	 to	 both	 administrative	
(missing	or	incomplete	paperwork)	and	criminal	(going	against	actual	trade	ban)	violations.		
	
The	policy	framework	itself	 is	vulnerable	to	criminality	in	several	ways.	The	Basel	Convention	
and	EU	legal	framework	for	waste	are	not	always	interpreted	and	implemented	with	the	same	
commitment	among	all	the	parties.	Not	all	countries	have	ratified	the	Basel	Convention	and	its	
Ban	Amendment.	Moreover,	 the	Basel	Convention	 is	primarily	 intended	 to	 regulate	 trade	and	
not	to	control	illegal	trade.	National	differences	in	policy	and	particularly	in	implementation	still	
exist,	even	within	the	EU.	A	particular	difficulty	is	distinguishing	the	illegal	exports	of	e‐waste	to	
non‐OECD	countries	and	the	 legal	exports	of	second‐hand	electronics.	The	latter	need	to	meet	
the	 following	requirements:	proof	of	 functionality;	contact	details	of	shippers	and	destination;	
and	 appropriate	 packaging.	 Despite	 these	 guidelines,	 it	 can	 still	 be	 challenging	 to	 distinguish	
between	 the	 two.	Overall,	 the	EU	waste	 legislation	 is	 very	 complex.	As	a	 consequence	of	 this,	
customs,	 harbormaster	 office	 and	 police	 rely	 on	 environmental	 inspectorates	 to	 judge	 the	
suspicious	 shipments.	 Even	 prosecutors	 admit	 the	 legal	 framework	 for	 waste	 is	 difficult	 to	
apply.	This	confirms	the	finding	that	waste	is	a	topic	with	many	rules	and	regulations	that	are	
not	 always	 practical	 (Huisman	 2001).	 This	 goes	 against	 one	 of	 the	 basic	 principles	 of	 good	
governance:	that	it	needs	to	be	understandable	(Braithwaite	2008).		
	
What	complicates	this	further	is	the	dynamic	nature	of	precisely	what	can	be	defined	as	e‐waste.	
There	 is	 a	 temporal	 dimension	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 every	 day	 more	 knowledge	 about	 harmful	
substances	emerges	but	also	another	dynamic	is	at	play	in	the	sense	that	the	discussion	about	
what	 is	 a	 second‐hand	 electronic	 product	 and	 what	 is	 e‐waste	 depends	 on	 the	 cultural	 and	
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socio‐economic	 context.	 Belgian	 definitions	 of	 e‐waste	 are	 different	 from	 Ghanaian	 and	
therefore	 definitions	 of	 environmental	 crime	 and	 harm	 also	 differ.	 Similar	 to	 other	 issues	 of	
environmental	 harm,	 the	 definition	 of	 what	 constitutes	 illegality	 varies	 over	 time,	 place	 and	
perspective	(White	2011).	It	is	not	easy	for	policy	and	legislation	to	incorporate	this	dynamism.	
	
Challenges	in	implementation	
Despite	 e‐waste	 fraud	 being	 an	 issue	 of	 national	 and	 international	 importance,	 resources	 are	
limited,	as	is	political	will	(Griffiths	and	Jenks	2012).	Both	in	countries	of	origin	and	destination,	
there	are	a	limited	number	of	people	involved	in	detection,	despite	the	multitude	of	government	
agencies	dealing	with	 it.	Environmental	 inspectorates	play	a	crucial	 role	and	usually	have	 the	
most	technical	expertise	about	waste	matters.	Environmental	inspectorates	are	also	those	with	
most	knowledge	about	waste	 collection,	 treatment	or	disposal	 facilities.	This	means	 that	 they	
can	address	companies	on	their	license	in	cases	of	administrative	violations	and	might	be	able	
to	 trace	 illegal	waste	 trade	back	 to	 its	 source.	There	 is	however	a	 serious	 lack	of	 capacity	 for	
administrative	 follow‐up	 of	 illegal	 waste	 transports,	 since	 inspectorates	 have	 limited	 staff.	
Police	officers	focus	on	environmental	issues	and	lead	criminal	investigations	into	waste	fraud	
but,	in	much	the	same	way,	they	are	limited	in	staff	and	resources.	One	way	to	come	across	any	
illegal	transport	of	e‐waste	is	through	the	control	of	shipments	in	harbors.	To	a	certain	degree,	
this	 is	 like	 looking	 for	a	needle	 in	a	haystack.	Customs	play	an	 important	 role	 in	 this	 through	
their	 risk	 analysis	 system	 for	 scanning	 and	 physically	 inspecting	 shipments.	 However,	
environmental	 issues	 are	 not	 a	 priority	 for	 customs,	 resulting	 in	 limited	 support	 from	 the	
hierarchy.	 Furthermore,	 the	 problem	 requires	 technical	 expertise	 that	 is	 not	 provided	 in	
training.	 Despite	 their	 knowledge	 and	 experience	 being	 crucial	 for	 the	 control	 of	 waste	
transports,	 enforcement	 agencies	 are	 constrained	 by	 their	 limited	 resources.	 ‘The	 problem	 is	
not	that	we	don’t	know	where	the	illicit	traffic	is,	know	where	to	find	it	or	know	how	to	check	it.	
The	 problem	 is	 that	 we	 don’t	 have	 the	 means	 to	 guarantee	 the	 follow‐up,	 that’s	 the	
bottleneck’(G14).	 This	 refers	 to	 those	 environmental	 inspectors	 and	 police	 officers	 that	 are	
governing	e‐waste	transports	on	a	daily	basis.	These	exceptions	to	the	rule	are	passionate	about	
their	job	but	frustration	does	occur.	
	
An	additional	challenge	of	EU	waste	policy	 is	 the	different	 implementation	 in	 the	EU	member	
states.	 The	 case	 of	 the	 port	 of	 Antwerp	 illustrates	 this	 perfectly.	 Belgian	 inspectorates	 who	
control	shipments	in	the	port	can	only	trace	illegal	waste	shipments	to	their	source	when	they	
originated	 in	 Belgium.	 As	 mentioned	 earlier,	 this	 is	 about	 one	 fifth	 of	 all	 waste	 transports	
through	the	port.	For	the	other	80	per	cent	of	waste	–	waste	in	transit	from	other	EU	countries	–	
the	exporting	member	states	are	responsible	for	ensuring	that	the	goods	accord	with	legislation.	
Similarly,	the	risk	analysis	system	of	Antwerp	customs	is	applied	to	import	and	export,	but	the	
transit	shipments	rely	on	 the	risk	analysis	of	 the	other	EU	countries.	However,	 these	member	
states	do	not	necessarily	interpret	or	implement	the	waste	legislation	in	the	same	way.	Not	all	
member	 states	 use	 complementary	 interventions	 as	 well	 as	 the	 traditional	 environmental	
inspection	and	when	controls	become	more	severe	in	one	country,	illegal	flows	shift	to	another.	
There	is	no	level	playing	field	for	controls	on	waste	in	the	EU.	Government,	corporate	and	civil	
society	respondents	even	notice	a	North‐South	and	West‐East	schism	in	Europe	concerning	the	
matter	 of	 how	 seriously	 inspections	 and	 transport	 controls	 are	 taken.	 This	 led	 different	
respondents	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 need	 for	 further	 harmonization	 of	 EU	 policy	 implementation	 to	
avoid	displacement	although	this	is	politically	very	sensitive.	Imposing	minimum	requirements	
for	 inspections	 and	 controls	 is	 often	 interpreted	 as	 too	 much	 interference	 from	 Europe,	
especially	 if	 that	would	 imply	 countries	 can	 call	 each	 other	 to	 order.	 Recently,	 the	 European	
Parliament	confirmed	an	agreement	to	revise	the	EU	rules	on	waste	shipments.		
	
The	new	law	will	ensure	that	member	states	are	obliged	to	make	comprehensive	
and	 meaningful	 inspection	 plans	 to	 check	 waste	 shipments,	 with	 a	 minimum	
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number	 of	 physical	 checks	 in	 line	 with	 the	 risk	 of	 illegal	 shipments.	 …	
Enforcement	will	 be	 stepped	 up,	with	more	 powers	 for	 authorities	 involved	 in	
inspections	 to	 check	 shipments.	 Cooperation	 between	 member	 states	 will	 be	
significantly	 strengthened.	 (MEP	 Bart	 Staes	 in	 The	 Greens/European	 Free	
Alliance	in	the	European	Parliament,	2014)		
	
Taking	 this	 a	 step	 further,	 setting	 up	 a	 European	 environment	 agency	 with	 inspectorate	
authority	might	be	beneficial	to	organize	the	controls	at	the	EU	level	and	create	a	more	unified	
system,	but	this	is	a	politically	very	sensitive	topic.	
	
Even	 if	definitions	and	 interpretations	were	equal,	Europe	–	 let	alone	global	policy	–	 is	a	 long	
way	 from	 harmonization	 of	 implementation.	 Prosecution	 of	 environmental	 crime	 remains	 a	
national	competence	with	significant	differences	between	European	countries	in	approach	and	
number	of	convictions	 (IMPEL‐TFS	2013).	To	avoid	criminals	 taking	advantage	of	 this,	 IMPEL	
identified	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 network	 of	 prosecutors	which	 could	 exchange	 relevant	 case	
law,	prosecution	information	such	as	the	level	of	fines,	working	methods,	prosecution	approach,	
interpretation	 and	 practical	 experiences.	 Although	 the	 European	 waste	 legislation	 requires	
sanctions	to	be	set,	there	are	major	differences	in	interpretation	and	implementation.	There	is	
prosecution	 of	 waste	 cases	 but	 fines	 that	 are	 imposed	 for	 illegal	 e‐waste	 transports	 are	
perceived	 as	 too	 low	 to	 be	 effective	 and	 become	part	 of	 shippers’	 business	 plans.	 One	 of	 the	
reasons	for	this	is	that,	although	it	is	often	possible	to	prove	one	shipment	is	illegal,	it	may	be	
hard	to	prove	this	has	happened	systemically.	Fines	differ	by	a	factor	of	100	across	the	EU.	Even	
within	 countries	 there	 are	 considerable	 differences	 in	 decision‐making	 (Sander	 and	 Schilling	
2010).	This	 is	similar	 to	 findings	about	the	 implementation	of	other	environmental	policies	 in	
the	 EU,	 where	 member	 states	 demonstrate	 substantial	 margins	 in	 their	 interpretations	 and	
determinations	of	sanctions	(Billiet	and	Meeus	2010).	To	counter	this,	 judges	could	be	guided	
about	 the	 seriousness	 of	 transnational	 environmental	 crime	 (White	 2011),	 as	 suggested	 by	
respondents	in	this	study.		
	
Also	 on	 the	 receiving	 end	 of	 the	 trade	 flows,	 in	 countries	 of	 destination	 like	 Ghana,	 the	
implementation	 of	 legislation	 can	 prove	 challenging.	 Ghana	 has	 signed	 international	
conventions	but	national	legislation	on	e‐waste	is	not	yet	in	place	although	a	proposal	for	a	bill	
on	 the	control	and	management	of	hazardous	waste	 in	general,	 and	on	E‐Waste	 in	particular,	
drafted	in	2012	had	to	be	re‐processed	after	the	December	2013	elections.	In	the	absence	of	a	
legal	basis	to	act,	the	main	concern	of	the	Ghanaian	Environmental	Protection	Agency	(EPA)	is	
raising	awareness	of	government	actors	about	the	dangers	of	e‐waste	since	many	consider	them	
as	 profitable	 second	 hand	products.	 The	 enforcement	 focus	 is	 on	 licensing	 recycling	 facilities	
and	 analyzing	where	WEEE/UEEE	might	 be	 sold	 and	 refurbished.	 However,	 these	 actors	 are	
numerous,	 very	 flexible	 and	 spread	 out	 across	 Ghana.	 The	 EPA	 also	 reaches	 out	 to	 informal	
actors	 and	 shows	 them	 how	 to	 improve	 working	 conditions.	 In	 theory,	 customs	 have	
governance	 potential	 in	 tackling	 the	 illegal	 e‐waste	 transports	 since	 they	 inspect	 and	 unload	
containers	 of	WEEE/UEEE.	 However,	 their	 priority	 is	 taxing	 the	 import	 of	 electronics	 rather	
than	checking	for	e‐waste.	In	case,	when	a	law	is	passed,	awareness	raising	and	training	of	these	
enforcers	 will	 be	 crucial.	 Even	 then,	 the	 problem	 remains	 that	 seized	 goods	 will	 have	 to	 be	
recycled	 locally,	 often	 ending	 up	 in	 the	 same	 system.	 Additionally,	 increased	 attention	 to	 the	
trade	 in	 e‐waste	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 solution	 to	 processing	 the	 large	 amounts	 of	 new	 and	
second‐hand	electronics	being	consumed	in	Ghana.	
	
Challenges	in	involving	local	governance	actors	
Overall,	 the	 governance	 framework	 seems	 to	be	 government	dominated	 for	 e‐waste,	whereas	
corporate	 and	 civil	 society	 actors	 are	 more	 passive.	 When	 the	 authority	 over	 a	 port	 area	 is	
spread	 across	 different	 terminal	 operators,	 municipalities,	 provinces	 and	 jurisdictions,	 this	
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renders	governance	complex,	but	in	recent	years	improvements	have	been	made	to	step	up	the	
cooperation	and	information	exchange	among	these	actors	in	the	port	of	Antwerp.	In	examining	
the	 governance	 reality	 of	 e‐waste,	 the	 primary	 actors	 in	 the	 control	 and	 prevention	 of	 illegal	
transport	 remain	 the	 inspectorates.	 In	 theory,	 these	 environmental	 inspectors	 can	 trace	
transports	 in	 violation	 of	 either	 administrative	 or	 criminal	 regulation	 to	 its	 source,	 usually	 a	
particular	 corporation	 involved	 in	 waste	 transport,	 collection,	 treatment	 or	 disposal.	 As	
mentioned	earlier,	 tracing	 the	transit	shipments	to	their	sources	remains	 the	responsibility	of	
governments	in	other	member	states.	This	approach	of	tracing	the	waste	to	its	source	does	not	
easily	apply	to	the	multitude	of	small	scale	(often	individual)	shippers.	Small	scale	collectors	are	
not	always	known	to	the	environmental	inspectorates.	To	be	more	exact,	it	might	be	a	shipment	
by	 one	 individual	 and	 not	 by	 a	 registered	waste	 corporation	 that	went	 through	 the	 licensing	
process	for	its	facility.	In	preventing	illegal	waste	shipments,	it	is	important,	however,	to	also	get	
a	 grip	 on	 these	 smaller	 scale	 actors.	 Relying	 too	 much	 on	 the	 regulatory	 activities	 of	
inspectorates,	 transport	controls	by	environmental	police	officers,	and	the	controls	in	harbors	
by	customs	or	harbormaster’s	offices,	 risks	not	getting	a	grip	on	waste	smuggling	at	 the	 local	
level.	In	identifying	those	smaller	scale	transports,	it	is	important	to	involve	local	governments	
and	 local	 police	 organizations,	 because	 they	 might	 have	 a	 better	 view	 on	 waste	 collection	
activities	–	at	whatever	scale	–	that	happen	in	their	communities.	This	would	allow	the	problem	
to	be	tackled	by	starting	at	the	root,	focusing	on	actors	earlier	in	the	supply	chain	of	electronics	
and	waste.		
	
The	local	level	of	governance	is	therefore	important	for	the	success	of	governing	environmental	
flows	 despite	 their	 transnational	 characteristics	 (Gille	 2006;	 Braithwaite	 2008).	 This	 is	
particularly	relevant	when	the	primary	concern	is	shifted	from	controlling	for	crime	to	avoiding	
environmental	harm.	In	developing	countries,	promising	local	initiatives	are	those	of	collecting	
and	dismantling	of	e‐waste	(for	example	in	Ghana),	where	scrap	dealers	are	taught	techniques	
to	dismantle	equipment	while	reducing	health	and	environmental	risks,	ultimately	resulting	in	
better	recovery	rates	for	the	raw	materials.	These	initiatives	are	still	very	few	and	are	usually	
set‐up	with	the	support	of	NGOs.	Local	Ghanaian	NGOs	also	combine	forces	with	 international	
organizations	 to	 develop	 capacity	 building.	 Similarly,	 they	 cooperate	 with	 (European)	
corporations	for	the	return	of	equipment	(for	example	motherboards).	Some	companies	are	also	
looking	to	follow	this	example	for	other	components	but	are	assessing	the	economic	feasibility.	
There	are	initiatives	to	turn	the	highly	efficient	informal	economy	of	waste	collection	into	a	less	
harmful	 waste	 industry	 that	 provides	 extra	 income	 for	 the	 population	 and	 prevents	 further	
pollution	 (prevention	 of	 hazardous	 waste	 leaking	 into	 the	 soil	 or	 prevention	 of	 burning	
hazardous	waste).	Although	many	of	these	initiatives	are	still	in	their	infancy,	this	shows	that	a	
broader	 network	 exists,	 beyond	 law	 enforcement	 alone,	 for	 dealing	 with	 e‐waste.	 Setting	 up	
these	initiatives	takes	time	because	local	characteristics	need	to	be	taken	into	account.	Insights	
are	needed	 about	how	and	why	 these	governance	 initiatives	work.	Only	 then	 is	 it	possible	 to	
evaluate	whether	 they	could	apply	 elsewhere.	This	also	 implies	 the	need	 to	avoid	 imposing	a	
Western	frame	of	reference	without	considering	local	differences.		
	
Challenges	in	interactions	between	governance	actors	
Given	 the	 above	 challenges	 presented	 by	 legal	 definitions	 and	 implementation	 of	 waste	
legislation,	 it	 seems	 fitting	 not	 to	 rely	 solely	 on	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 to	 prevent	
environmental	 harm	 from	 inadequate	 disposal	 of	 e‐waste	 and	 control	 illegal	 transports	 of	 e‐
waste.	Complex	problems	such	as	environmental	issues	are	not	easily	governed	by	a	single	actor	
and	 a	 networked	 governance	 model	 might	 fare	 better	 (Holley	 et	 al.	 2012).	 In	 interaction,	
however,	 it	 is	 not	 always	 easy	 to	 work	 towards	 the	 same	 goals,	 even	 amongst	 government	
agencies	–	as	the	e‐waste	case	demonstrates.	The	governance	of	e‐waste	cuts	through	different	
layers	of	authority.	Each	of	the	government	actors	that	were	examined	in	this	study	were	aware	
that	their	work	was	only	one	part	of	a	broader	system.	Depending	on	the	features	of	the	case,	
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one	or	another	actor	took	a	leading	role,	either	for	practical	reasons	due	to	available	expertise	
or	out	of	 concern	 for	an	 integrated	approach.	The	 judiciary	clearly	 takes	a	 leading	 role	 in	 the	
approach	to	waste	fraud	in	the	port	of	Antwerp.	Customs	take	a	leading	role	in	the	risk	analysis	
system.	 Inspectorates	 and	 administrations	 have	 expertise	 on	 environmental	 issues.	 Although	
these	actors	are	all	part	of	the	network	or	the	chain	that	responds	to	these	issues,	their	methods	
and	 responsibilities	 are	 different.	 One	 of	 the	 criticisms	 of	 corporations	 is	 that	 the	
implementation	 of	 the	 law	 seems	 to	 be	 valued	 higher	 than	 the	 matter	 of	 environmental	
importance.	Corporations	experience	an	extra	burden	in	terms	of	administration	because	of	the	
fragmentation	 of	 agencies	 and	 perceive	 this	 as	 an	 inefficient	 use	 by	 government	 of	 already	
limited	 environmental	 enforcement	 resources.	 This	 efficiency	 of	 the	 network	 will	 become	
increasingly	important,	given	the	continued	expansion	of	the	Antwerp	harbor	and	its	trade	flow.	
This	fragmentation	of	responsibility	is	also	being	addressed	in	Belgian	institutional	reforms.	
	
Waste	is	a	topic,	just	like	other	environmental	issues,	that	can	be	dealt	with	by	administrative	as	
well	 as	 criminal	 proceedings	 and	 neither	 necessarily	 have	 the	 same	 objectives	 in	 mind.	
Transparency	and	clear	delineation	of	tasks	and	objectives	is	crucial	to	avoid	government	actors	
fighting	 each	other	 instead	of	 fighting	 crime	 (Sluis	 et	 al.	 2012).	The	question	 is	 then	whether	
these	 actors	 work	 with	 the	 same	 intentions	 in	 mind	 and	 the	 same	 realities	 at	 hand.	
Environmental	 inspectorates	 focus	 on	 illegal	 transports	 of	 e‐waste	 but	 also	 take	 into	 account	
the	 broader	 concern	 of	 avoiding	 environmental	 harm.	 Administration	 systems	 are	 similarly	
oriented	to	environmental	issues,	but	focus	on	initiatives	earlier	in	the	chain	(licenses)	as	well	
as	on	policy.	The	focus	of	customs	and	harbormaster’s	office	on	illegal	trade	in	e‐waste	is	rather	
recent	and	struggles	with	balancing	concerns	for	security	and	the	economy.	Customs	specializes	
in	responsibilities	 that	are	at	 the	front	 line	 in	 import	and	export	of	waste;	 it	has	the	 technical	
means	to	control	(scanning	of	containers	and	risk	analysis)	and	has	many	‘eyes	and	ears’.	Note,	
however,	 that	 their	 risk	 analysis	 system	which	 relies	on	a	 large	basis	of	 trust	 in	 corporations	
(potentially)	 does	 not	 match	 the	 approaches	 of	 other	 government	 actors.	 Questions	 remain	
whether	this	system	of	trust	in	economic	operators	by	customs	and	even	the	system	of	trust	in	
compliance	by	 the	environmental	administrations	can	be	united	with	 the	strategies	of	 judicial	
actors	 that	 proceed	 in	 their	 work	 based	 on	 distrust.	 The	 police	 and	 the	 judiciary	 are	 both	
concerned	with	illegal	transport	of	e‐waste	because	they	are	environmental	crimes	and	have	a	
potential	link	to	‘organized	crime’.	This	only	concerns	the	serious	and	extensive	cases.		
	
Besides	 the	 various	 initiatives	 for	 international	 networking,	 the	 responsible	 authorities	
cooperate	bilaterally	with	 their	neighboring	countries	as	well	as	with	countries	of	destination	
such	as	Ghana,	but	with	limited	staff	and	resources	this	can	be	difficult.	Different	international	
guidelines	 and	 soft	measures	exist	 and	are	 stimulated	by	organizations	 such	as	 the	European	
Union	 Network	 for	 the	 Implementation	 and	 Enforcement	 of	 Environmental	 Law	 (IMPEL),	
International	Network	for	Environmental	Compliance	and	Enforcement	(INECE),	Secretariat	of	
the	 Basel	 Convention,	 the	 World	 Customs	 Organization	 (WCO)	 and	 the	 Solving	 the	 E‐waste	
Problem	 (StEP)	 initiative.	 These	 initiatives	 organize	 training	 sessions	 in	 countries	 of	
destination,	 function	 as	 advisors	 and	 fund	 capacity‐building	 projects.	 One	 challenge	 to	 these	
international	 networking	 initiatives	 is	 their	 voluntary	 character.	 Unambiguous	measures	 (for	
example	 inspections	 and	 controls)	 are	 more	 difficult	 to	 agree	 on	 though	 this	 should	 not	 be	
surprising	given	the	known	problems	of	global	environmental	governance	(Iwama	2004):	an	ad	
hoc	 or	 fragmented	 approach;	 a	 missing	 link	 between	 policy	 making	 and	 implementation;	
conflicting	 or	 overlapping	 responsibilities	 between	 different	 agencies;	 a	 lack	 of	 a	 powerful	
competent	 authority;	 and	 NGOs	 and	 corporate	 actors	 not	 being	 reflected	 in	 multilateral	
environmental	 initiatives.	 Despite	 significant	 improvements	 in	 policy	 making	 and	 –	 more	
recently	–	implementation,	many	of	the	above	problems	apply	to	the	governance	of	e‐waste.		
	
From	a	governance	perspective,	non‐government	actors	have	a	valuable	role	to	play,	although	
this	is	currently	not	exploited	to	its	full	potential	in	the	case	of	e‐waste.	Both	corporations	and	
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civil	 society	 stakeholders	 come	 to	 mind.	 When	 taking	 the	 supply	 chain	 of	 electronics	 into	
account,	producers,	 recyclers,	 transport	actors	and	consumers	become	part	of	 the	governance	
framework.	Not	all	producers	and	recyclers	as	well	as	transport	actors	are	currently	proactive	
in	 self‐regulating	 their	 sector,	 despite	 the	 governance	 potential	 they	may	 have.	 For	 instance,	
transport	actors	could	be	encouraged	to	be	more	diligent	and	transparent.	A	first	important	step	
is	 raising	 awareness	 about	 this.	 Many	 company	 brochures	 and	 websites	 already	 mention	
sustainability	and	 related	 issues,	but	 there	 is	a	need	 for	 further	 translation	of	 awareness	 into	
practice	in	both	Belgium	and	Ghana.	As	witnessed	during	the	field	visits	and	interviews,	many	
port	actors	do	not	know	what	e‐waste	is	and	are	unaware	of	the	potential	harms.		
	
This	 information	 campaign	 should	 contain	practical	 advice	 directed	not	 only	 at	
the	 managers	 of	 these	 companies	 but	 also	 at	 the	 actual	 goods	 handlers.	 This	
might	not	stop	crafty	criminals	from	shipping	e‐waste	illegally	but	might	address	
‘low	hanging	fruit’.	(Civil	society	respondent	20)		
	
This	will	likely	require	a	few	major	shipping	lines	to	take	the	lead	as	is	happening	today,	but	it	
might	be	more	difficult	to	involve	smaller	actors	like	shipping	agents,	‘because	these	often	have	
neither	 the	 resources	 nor	 the	 management	 structure	 to	 seriously	 deal	 with	 this’	 (Corporate	
respondent	5).	A	second	step	might	be	to	increase	information	exchange	about	the	flows	–	both	
legal	and	illegal	–providing	better	grounds	on	which	to	address	illegal	trade.	As	a	testimony	to	
the	governance	potential	of	shipping	lines,	they	are	already	partners	of	the	waste	enforcement	
agencies	 in	 England	 and	Wales,	 in	 this	way	 helping	 to	 keep	 their	 businesses	 clean	 and	 trace	
waste	back	to	its	origin.	It	is	however	not	possible	to	simply	replicate	this	in	Antwerp	where	the	
share	of	transit	in	the	waste	trade	is	much	bigger	(80	per	cent	in	Antwerp	versus	10	per	cent	in	
England	 and	 Wales).	 A	 similar	 development	 is	 occurring	 in	 countries	 of	 destination	 where	
shipping	lines	are	increasingly	providing	the	authorities	with	information	to	facilitate	controls	
or	even	providing	warnings	in	cases	where	suspicions	about	the	nature	of	the	shipment	arise.		
	
By	phasing	 out	hazardous	 components,	 producers	 can	 ensure	 that	 the	 recycling	 of	 e‐waste	 is	
less	harmful.	Through	eco‐design,	 they	can	 increase	 the	 life	 cycles	of	products.	Economic	and	
environmental	 interests,	 however,	 do	 not	 always	 coincide.	 Consequently,	 the	 involvement	 of	
producers	 and	 recyclers	 is	 largely	 determined	 by	 the	 potential	 gains	 from	 being	
environmentally	 responsible,	 either	 financially	 or	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 corporate	 image.	 An	
important	governance	potential,	however,	lies	in	linking	the	illegal	transports	of	e‐waste	to	the	
EU’s	lack	of	raw	materials.	This	is	an	important	incentive	for	European	industry,	especially	since	
it	 is	 often	 more	 energy‐efficient	 to	 extract	 precious	 metals	 from	 e‐waste	 than	 from	 mines.	
Protecting	the	secondary	raw	materials	and	keeping	these	within	Europe	is	increasingly	going	
hand‐in‐hand	with	the	objective	of	avoiding	further	environmental	degradation	in	countries	of	
destination	of	e‐waste	 transports.	Despite	 these	self‐regulatory	efforts,	 corporate	actors	could	
play	a	more	significant	role:	for	instance	through	regulated	self‐regulation	in	the	governance	of	
illegal	 e‐waste	 trade.	 This	will,	 of	 course,	 require	 carefully	 designed	 incentives,	 both	 positive	
and	negative	(Gunningham	et	al.	1998;	Holley	et	al.	2012).	
	
Apart	 from	the	role	 for	corporations,	 the	civil	society	representatives	 like	NGOs	play	a	role	 in	
governance.	 This	 happens	 by	 raising	 consumer	 awareness	 and	 by	 keeping	 governments	 and	
corporations	 on	 their	 toes	 about	 environmental	 topics.	 During	 the	 field	 visits,	 it	 also	 became	
clear	that	NGOs	play	an	important	role	in	engaging	local	actors	in	Ghana.	By	setting	up	capacity‐
building	 projects,	 they	 are	 reaching	 out	 to	 actors	 who	 are	 currently	 not	 always	 involved	 in	
governance.	 Many	 of	 these	 initiatives	 are	 small‐scale	 and	 ad	 hoc	 but	 have	 the	 potential	 to	
address	 the	 structural	 causes	 of	 the	 illegal	 trade	 in	 e‐waste.	 They	 can,	 for	 instance,	 aim	 to	
reduce	 the	 demand	 for	 WEEE/UEEE	 by	 highlighting	 the	 fact	 that	 dismantling	 e‐waste	 and	
second‐hand	electronics	in	search	of	precious	metals	is	the	sole	source	of	a	secure	livelihood	for	
many	people	in	countries	of	destination.	More	importantly,	they	can	avoid	the	immediate	harm	
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by	 teaching	 informal	 workers	 about	 more	 environmentally	 and	 health‐friendly	 dismantling	
techniques.	This	would	address	both	the	illegal	trade	in	e‐waste	and	the	domestic	consumption	
of	electronics.	
	
Conclusion	
This	article	set	out	to	shed	light	on	how	e‐waste	 is	a	challenge	for	environmental	governance.	
Challenges	 inherent	 in	 legal	 definitions	 and	 policy	making	 remain,	 only	 outnumbered	 by	 the	
challenges	 inherent	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 waste	 policy.	 The	 analysis	 of	 the	 reality	 of	
governance	 illustrates	 how	 the	 control	 of	 illegal	 e‐waste	 flows	 is	 primarily	 taken	 up	 by	
government	 actors,	which	 is	 not	 surprising	 given	 its	 criminalisation.	 An	 important	 challenge,	
however,	 is	 the	 underfunding	 of	 these	 government	 actors,	 with	 consequences	 for	 training,	
resources	and	effective	follow‐up	throughout	the	flows	(See	also	Brack	et	al.	2002).	Despite	the	
good	intentions	of	many	and	the	improvements	made	in	the	last	decade,	both	the	administrative	
and	 the	 criminal	 approaches	 in	 dealing	with	 illegal	 transports	 of	 e‐waste	 could	 be	 improved.	
Even	in	a	region	like	the	EU	that	can	be	considered	an	environmental	forerunner	(Vig	and	Faure	
2004),	environmental	law	enforcement	is	perceived	to	be	too	slow	and	too	weak	in	responding	
to	environmental	crime.	An	 important	characteristic	of	responsive	regulation	 is	 the	escalation	
towards	more	 punitive	measures	 in	 cases	 of	 (continued)	 non‐compliance	 (Braithwaite	 2008;	
Nielsen	and	Parker	2009).	As	has	been	illustrated	here,	this	escalation	is	not	at	all	certain	for	the	
illegal	trade	in	e‐waste	in	the	countries	of	origin	and	even	less	so	in	the	countries	of	destination.	
For	 environmental	 governance	 to	 work,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 gain	 insights	 into	 the	 objectives	 and	
realities	of	each	separate	governance	actor,	so	as	to	understand	basic	assumptions	that	might	be	
influencing	 their	 cooperation.	This	might	 require	 trying	 to	overcome	differences	and	working	
towards	the	same	end,	despite	different	objectives	and	means.	This	also	requires	clarity	about	
whether	 avoiding	 environmental	 harm	 or	 preventing	 environmental	 crime	 is	 the	 primary	
concern.	 Through	 a	 networked	 governance	 approaches,	 different	 interests	 can	 be	 taken	 into	
account	 and	 negotiation	 can	 proceed	 based	 on	 each	 actor’s	 capacity.	 This	means	 taking	 into	
account	 not	 only	 what	 is	 strictly	 defined	 as	 illegal	 but	 also	 the	 broader	 dimensions,	 thus	
allowing	a	more	complete	account	of	social	phenomena.	The	diversity	of	actors	and	reasons	for	
getting	 involved	 in	 illegal	 e‐waste	 transport	 or	 sub‐standard	 treatment	 of	 e‐waste,	 inevitably	
means	 taking	many	 actors	 into	 account	 in	 countries	 of	 origin,	 transit	 and	 destination	 and	 on	
local,	 national	 and	 international	 levels.	 This	 of	 course	 renders	 the	 arrangement	of	 networked	
governance	 very	 complex,	 going	 against	 the	 idea	 that	 networked	 governance	 for	 the	
environment	is	easiest	in	a	small	scale	setting	with	limited	complexity	(Holley	et	al.	2012).	
	
A	 more	 comprehensive	 governance	 picture	 emerges	 when	 the	 gaze	 is	 broadened	 from	
controlling	 for	 illegal	 transports	 of	 e‐waste	 to	 preventing	 environmental	 harm	 through	 sub‐
standard	 recycling	 practices.	 This	makes	 it	 possible	 to	 look	 for	 governance	 frameworks	 that	
involve	actors	throughout	the	supply	chain	of	electronics	and	not	merely	those	that	contribute	
to	or	control	 for	(illegal)	 trade	 in	e‐waste.	The	emergence	of	new	actors,	outside	 the	state,	on	
local	 levels	 and	 in	 new	 cooperative	 arrangements	 fits	 a	 view	 on	 ‘world	 politics	 that	 are	 no	
longer	confined	to	nation	states	but	are	characterized	by	increasing	participation	of	actors	that	
have	 so	 far	 been	 largely	 active	 at	 the	 subnational	 level’	 (Biermann	 and	 Pattberg	 2008:	 280).	
Insight	 regarding	 the	 potential	 and	 challenges	 of	 these	 new	 environmental	 governance	
arrangements	 is	 needed.	 In	 the	 interaction	 between	 governments	 and	 corporate	 and	 civil	
society	on	 the	topic	of	e‐waste,	 the	need	 for	clarity	about	objectives	and	 for	working	towards	
similar	 ends	 despite	 differences	 remains	 a	 challenge.	 Also,	 the	 different	 perspectives	 of	 the	
developed	 and	 developing	 countries	 will	 require	 environmental	 governance	 mechanisms	 to	
assess	 challenges	 and	 strengths	 within	 particular	 local	 contexts.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	
inherently	global	dynamics	of	 the	trade	in	electronics	as	well	as	of	environment	harm	require	
governance	 mechanisms	 that	 cut	 across	 national	 and	 institutional	 boundaries.	 A	 locally	
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grounded	 and	 globally	 informed	 governance	 network	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 prevent	 further	
environmental	harms	caused	by	the	supply	chain	of	electronics.		
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1	This	research	was	funded	by	Ghent	University	where	the	author	has	a	continuing	affiliation.	
2	E‐waste	 refers	 to	all	 types	of	electrical	 and	electronic	equipment	 (EEE)	 that	 is	discarded,	 such	as	 television	 sets,	
computers,	 mobile	 phones,	 tablets,	 refrigerators,	 washing	 machines,	 dryers,	 home	 entertainment	 and	 stereo	
systems	and	toys.	
3	For	more	information,	please	consult	http://ewasteguide.info/hazardous_substances	(accessed	29	May	2014).	
4	For	more	information,	please	consult	
http://www.cec.org/hazwaste/Page.asp?PageID=5001&ContentID=341&SiteNodeID=204&BL_ExpandID=60	
(accessed	29	May	2014).	
5	The	discovery	of	and	media	attention	for	dump	sites	of	toxic	waste	in	developing	countries	during	the	1980s	and	
1990s	 led	 to	 the	 adoption	 of	 international	 and	 European	 legislative	 frameworks	 that	 regulate	waste	 transports.	
Examples	of	these	are	the	Basel	Convention	on	the	Control	of	Transboundary	Movements	of	Hazardous	Wastes	and	
their	Disposal;	Montreal	Protocol	on	Ozone‐Depleting	Substances;	and	OECD	Decision	on	Control	of	Cross‐Border	
Movements	of	Waste	Destined	for	Recovery	Operations;	European	Waste	Shipment	Regulation;	Directive	on	Waste	
Electrical	and	Electronic	Equipment;	Bamako	Convention	on	the	Ban	of	 the	Import	 into	Africa	and	the	Control	of	
Transboundary	Movement	and	Management	of	Hazardous	Wastes	within	Africa.	
6	 Over	 the	 several	 phases	 of	 IMPEL‐TFS	 measurements	 (2006,	 2012),	 the	 number	 of	 administrative	 violations	
decreased	from	52	to	37	per	cent,	but	the	number	of	illegal	shipments,	subject	to	an	export	ban	increased	from	33	
to	38	per	cent.	
7	 More	 detailed	 information	 about	 this	 study	 and	 its	 findings	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 following	 book:	 Bisschop	 L	
(forthcoming)	 Governance	 of	 the	 Illegal	 Trade	 in	 e‐Waste	 and	 Tropical	 Timber:	 Case	 studies	 on	 Transnational	
Environmental	Crime.	Ashgate	Green	Criminology	Series.	
8	For	instance	the	European	WEEE	Directive	(on	waste	of	electronic	and	electrical	equipment)	or	the	Directive	on	the	
Restriction	of	hazardous	substances.		
9	 These	 risk	 indicators	 can	 refer	 to	 particular	 destinations	 (risk	 countries,	 suspicious	 streets),	 descriptions	 of	 the	
goods,	value	added	tax	(VAT)	numbers	and	the	value	of	the	goods.	
10	For	instance:	UNDP	(solid	waste	management);	WTO	(sustainable/recycling	waste	trade);	World	Bank	(solid	waste	
management);	OECD	(waste	management,	 sustainable	use	of	materials);	WCO	(combating	environmental	crime	–	
MEAs);	Interpol	(illegal	waste	trade).	
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